America will become a Muslim country of Mexicans who are ALL Gay!!!!!!

How could I have forgotten? :) Seriously, though...that's exactly what was happening at the time of the Loving case. States were denying, and even criminalizing interracial marriages on a State by State basis. The Loving decision established (among other things) that this was improper, and that the 14th Amendment guaranteed the freedom to marry as a fundamental right afforded to all citizens, regardless of their State of residence.

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"cdesign proponentsists" - (LINK)

The particular case involved an anti-miscegenation statute, but the legal precedents set by Loving were far more reaching. Loving clearly identifies the freedom to marry as a basic civil right that is protected from invidious classification by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has already acknowledged the similarity between anti-miscegenation (and the Loving case in particular) to the issue of LGBT rights...

“Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.” ~ Lawrence v. Texas

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"cdesign proponentsists" - (LINK)

...but it is, I think, warranted...

Your faith in the Supremes is misplaced.
They are more conservitive not less than the various State Courts.

It is true that we have a very conservative SCOTUS, but then true conservatives tend to reject the notion that the government should be able to insert itself into the private lives of citizens, and especially into private contracts (like marriages).

Multiple State Supreme Courts including New York, Maryland, Washington & now Road Island have said that there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, that laws defining marriage as a union of husband and wife are substantially different from those banning interracial marriage, and that the link between marriage and procreation justifies the state's definition of marriage as a union of husband and wife.

You can quote as many STATE Supreme Courts as you like. The STATE Supreme Court of Virgina likewise affirmed the validity of that State's anti-miscegenation laws before the Supreme Court of the United States struck them down. No matter how much you don't like the the SCOTUS has already acknowledged the validity of the Loving comparison in this issue in multiple, standing precedents. To suggest that the High Court will suddenly flip-flop on three landmark precedents is a very shaky argument, I think.

You are making the same mistake the New York Court points out in its recent decision. Discussing the Supreme Court precedents of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)

If I am, then I am making the same mistake that the High Court has made...which really means that it isn't a mistake, at all.

Judge Graffeo noted….

“To ignore the meaning ascribed to the right to marry in these cases and substitute another meaning in its place is to redefine the right in question and to tear the resulting new right away from the very roots that caused the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court to recognize marriage as a fundamental right in the first place.”2

The Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state’s highest court) issued a recent decision Deane & Polyak,v. Conaway,

Sighting the same United States Supreme Court precedents as the N.Y court : the Marryland High Court noted that these previous cases recognizing a fundamental right to marry“infer that the right to marry enjoys its fundamental status due to the male-female nature of the relationship and/or the attendant link to fostering procreation of our species.” In fact, the court said that virtually all of the cases “indicate as the basis for the conclusion the institution’s inextricable link to procreation, which necessarily and biologically involves participation (in ways either intimate or remote) by a man and a woman.”

There are two fundamental flaws in these cases. The first is that there is no longer ANY connection between procreative rights and marital rights. There used to be, but our country has long since eliminated the legal status of "illegitimate" from its laws. Currently, there is not ONE law in any jurisdiction of this country that provides even ONE right or priviledge relating to the parent-child relationship that is contingent on the marital status of the parents. Legitimacy used to be a significant concern, but it is so no longer. Secondly, appeals of this sort represent no protection at all from the decisions of the High Court, as the SCOTUS itself pointed out in Lawrence.

"Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack."

In one stroke of their collective pen, the SCOTUS noted not only that the history and tradition of marriage in this country is irrelevant to the question of whether or not those practices are constitutionally valid, but it also notes the maked similarity between anti-gay laws and anti-miscegation laws. Deny it to your hearts content, but a SCOTUS precedent trumps the rulings of a State Supreme Court every time.

In terms of the justifications for the current marriage law, the court ruled “fostering procreation is a legitimate government interest” and the “‘inextricable link’ between marriage and procreation reasonably could support the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman only, because it is that relationship that is capable of producing biological offspring of both members

The court held “the fundamental right to marriage and its ensuing benefits are conferred on opposite-sex couples not because of a distinction between whether various opposite-sex couples actually procreate, but rather because of the possibility of procreation.”

These further comments also demonstrate another major flaw, which is the fact that in U.S. law, de facto families are entitled to the same protections as biological families. We already offer protection to families that are incapable of biologically producing children (in the case of sterility, adoption, etc.). A gay couple who adopts a child is just as much a family as a heterosexual couple who does the same, and there is a painfully obvious disparity in saying that a heterosexual couples can seek marriage to protect their family, while a gay couple cannot.

Your seem to feel that your evaluation of the Loving case is absolute, but in each of the cases you have cited, there have been strong dissents issued from the bench that offer exactly the arguments which I have presented, and which the Supreme Court of the United States has implied in its standing precedents. I think that Chief Judge Kay's dissent in Hernandez case is particularly well expressed and poignant...

This State has a proud tradition of affording equal rights to all New Yorkers. Sadly, the Court today retreats from that proud tradition...Under both the State and Federal Constitutions, the right to due process of law protects certain fundamental liberty interests, including the right to marry. Central to the right to marry is the right to marry the person of one's choice (see e.g. Crosby v State of N.Y., Workers' Compensation Bd., 57 NY2d 305, 312 [1982] ["clearly falling within (the right of privacy) are matters relating to the decision of whom one will marry"]; People v Shepard, 50 NY2d 640, 644 [1980] ["the government has been prevented from interfering with an individual's decision about whom to marry"]). The deprivation of a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny and requires that the infringement be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest (see e.g. Carey v Population Servs. Intl., 431 US 678, 686 [1977]). Fundamental rights are those "which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed" (Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702, 720-721 [1997] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Again and again, the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that the right to marry is fundamental (see e.g. Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1 [1967]; Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374 [1978]; Turner v Safley, 482 US 78 [1987]; Matter of Doe v Coughlin, 71 NY2d 48, 52 [1987]; Cooper v Morin, 49 NY2d 69, 80 [1979]; Levin v Yeshiva Univ., 96 NY2d 484, 500 [2001] [Smith, J., concurring] ["marriage is a fundamental constitutional right"]). The Court concludes, however, that same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in tradition, and thus cannot implicate any fundamental liberty. But fundamental rights, once recognized, cannot be denied to particular groups on the ground that these
groups have historically been denied those rights. Indeed, in recasting plaintiffs' invocation of their fundamental right to marry as a request for recognition of a "new" right to same-sex marriage, the Court misapprehends the nature of the liberty interest at stake. In Lawrence v Texas (539 US 558 [2003]), the Supreme Court warned against such error.

Chief Judge Kay noted as I have that the the Court is making exactly the error which the Suprme Court has warned against in Lawrence.

Lawrence overruled Bowers v Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), which had upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. In so doing, the Lawrence Court criticized Bowers for framing the issue presented too narrowly. Declaring that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today" (539 US at 578), Lawrence explained that Bowers purported to analyze--erroneously-- whether the Constitution conferred a "fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy" (539 US at 566 [citation omitted]). This was, however, the wrong question. The fundamental right at issue, properly framed, was the right to engage in private consensual sexual conduct--a right that applied to both homosexuals and heterosexuals alike. In narrowing the claimed liberty interest to embody the very exclusion being challenged, Bowers "disclose[d] the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake" (Lawrence, 539 US at 567).

The same failure is evident here. An asserted liberty interest is not to be characterized so narrowly as to make inevitable the conclusion that the claimed right could not be fundamental because historically it has been denied to those who now seek to exercise it (see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v Casey, 505 US 833, 847 [1992] [it is "tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. . . . But such a view would be inconsistent with our law."]).

Again, Chief Judge Kay notes that the reasoning offered by the majority in Hernandez very specifically fails to meet the extant precedents of the High Court. But, here is where it gets really good...

Simply put, fundamental rights are fundamental rights. They are not defined in terms of who is entitled to exercise them. Instead, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the fundamental right to marry must be afforded even to those who have previously been excluded from its scope--that is, to those whose exclusion from the right was "deeply rooted."...To those who appealed to history as a basis for prohibiting interracial marriage, it was simply inconceivable that the right of interracial couples to marry could be deemed "fundamental." Incredible as it may seem today, during the lifetime of every Judge on this Court, interracial marriage was forbidden in at least a third of American jurisdictions. In 1948, New York was one of only 18 states in the nation that did not have such a ban. By 1967, when Loving was decided, 17 states still outlawed marriages between persons of different races. Nevertheless, even though it was the ban on interracial marriage--not interracial marriage itself--that had a long and shameful national tradition, the Supreme Court determined that interracial couples could not be deprived of their fundamental
right to marry. Unconstitutional infringements on the right to marry are not limited to impermissible racial restrictions....The state law at issue here, like the law struck down in Loving, restricts an individual's right to marry the person of his or her choice.

Chief Judge Kay also criticizes the dishonest that is inherent to your argument...

The claim that marriage has always had a single and unalterable meaning is a plain distortion of history. In truth, the common understanding of "marriage" has changed dramatically over the centuries (see Br. of Professors of History and Family Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs). Until well into the nineteenth century, for example, marriage was defined by the doctrine of coverture, according to which the wife's legal identity was merged into that of her husband, whose property she became. A married woman, by definition, could not own property and could not enter into contracts.2 Such was the very "meaning" of marriage. Only since the mid-twentieth century has the institution of marriage come to be understood as a relationship between two equal partners, founded upon shared intimacy and mutual financial and emotional support. Indeed, as amici professors note, "The historical record shows that, through adjudication and legislation, all of New York's sex-specific rules for marriage have been invalidated save for the one at issue here" (Br. of Professors of History and Family Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, at 2).

And here again Chief Judge Kay notes that the New York Court is ruling against the warnings in Lawrence...

In closing, you may deny the relevance of the Loving decision to this issue, but as the Chief Judge on the bench of the very Court you cite notes very specifically that this decision is inconsistent both with the precedents of the New York State Supreme Court AND of the United States Supreme Court. As Chief Judge Kay concluded...

It is uniquely the function of the Judicial Branch to safeguard individual liberties guaranteed by the New York State Constitution, and to order redress for their violation. The Court's duty to protect constitutional rights is an imperative of the separation of powers, not its enemy. I am confident that future generations will look back on today's decision as an unfortunate misstep.

...and with that sentiment I certainly agree.

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"cdesign proponentsists" - (LINK)